Farmers' Preferences For Bluetongue Vaccination Scheme Attributes : An Integrated Choice and Latent Variable Approach by Sok, Jaap et al.
 
Farmers' Preferences For Bluetongue Vaccination Scheme Attributes: An 
Integrated Choice and Latent Variable Approach 
Sok, J., van der Lans, I. A., Hogeveen, H., Elbers, A. R. W., & Oude Lansink, 
A. G. J. M. 
 
This article is made publically available in the institutional repository of Wageningen 
University and Research, under article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, also known 
as the Amendment Taverne. 
Article 25fa states that the author of a short scientific work funded either wholly or 
partially by Dutch public funds is entitled to make that work publicly available for no 
consideration following a reasonable period of time after the work was first 
published, provided that clear reference is made to the source of the first publication 
of the work. 
For questions regarding the public availability of this article, please contact 
openscience.library@wur.nl. 
Please cite this publication as follows: 
Sok, J., van der Lans, I. A., Hogeveen, H., Elbers, A. R. W., & Oude Lansink, A. G. J. 
M. (2018). Farmers' Preferences For Bluetongue Vaccination Scheme Attributes: An 
Integrated Choice and Latent Variable Approach. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
69(2), 537-560. https://doi.org/10.1111/1477-9552.12249 
Farmers’ Preferences For Bluetongue
Vaccination Scheme Attributes: An
Integrated Choice and Latent Variable
Approach
Jaap Sok, Ivo A. van der Lans, Henk Hogeveen,
Armin R. W. Elbers and Alfons G. J. M. Oude Lansink1
(Original submitted December 2016, revision received June 2017, accepted July 2017.)
Abstract
Re-emergence of the bluetongue disease in Europe poses a continuous threat to
European livestock production. Large-scale vaccination is the most eﬀective inter-
vention to control virus spread. Compared to command-and-control approaches,
voluntary vaccination approaches can be eﬀective at lower costs, provided that
farmers are willing to participate. We use a discrete choice experiment to estimate
the preferences for vaccination scheme attributes, accounting for preference
heterogeneity via an integrated choice and latent variable approach. In designing
livestock disease control schemes, it is often argued that governments should use
ﬁnancial, incentive-based policy instruments to compensate farmers for externali-
ties, assuming they act in rational self-interest. Our results suggest that in addition
to economic motives, farmers can have intrinsic or social motives to invest in live-
stock disease control. Implications for the eﬀectiveness of providing subsidy or
information to motivate voluntary participation are discussed.
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1. Introduction
Bluetongue is a vector-borne livestock disease caused by the bluetongue virus, and
has been identiﬁed on all continents except Antarctica. Biting midges (Culicoides spp.)
transmit the virus from infected to susceptible ruminants (Maclachlan, 2011). An out-
break of a vector-borne disease can have large socio-economic consequences in terms
of livestock production, policy and trade in the countries or regions aﬀected (Burrell,
2002). A large epidemic of bluetongue virus serotype 8 occurred in Europe during
2006 to 2009. Several years later, multiple outbreaks were reported in France in the
autumn of 2015 (Saileau et al., 2017). Re-emergence of bluetongue in Europe poses a
continuous threat for livestock production. Large-scale vaccination is the most eﬀec-
tive intervention to control the spread (e.g. Wilson and Mellor, 2009).
Livestock disease control policies have traditionally followed a command-and-con-
trol approach of regulation and enforcement, but voluntary approaches are now also
being considered. During the bluetongue virus serotype 8 epidemic in 2006 to 2009,
some European Union Member States adopted voluntary vaccination schemes (Wil-
son and Mellor, 2009). Outbreaks in France continued to be reported in 2016 and ani-
mal health authorities in the UK have been considering whether vaccination strategies
should be implemented, and in what form (Bessell et al., 2016; Roberts et al., 2016).
Voluntary approaches are more ﬂexible in terms of legislation and can also be eﬀec-
tive at lower costs, provided that farmers are willing to participate (Segerson, 2013).
Theoretical economic studies that take into account the endogenous nature of infec-
tion risk, predict that farmers are likely to underinvest in private disease control mea-
sures compared to a social welfare optimum because of the presence of externalities
(e.g. Beach et al., 2007; Rat-Aspert and Fourichon, 2010; Gramig and Horan, 2011;
Zilberman et al., 2012), since vaccination helps a region become disease free, while no
vaccination contributes to disease transmission. Public intervention may be justiﬁed
when such market failures occur. Other market failures arise from information asym-
metries, resulting in moral hazard and adverse selection problems (e.g. Gramig et al.,
2009; Hennessy and Wolf, 2015). These studies focus on the design and use of ﬁnan-
cial, incentive-based policy instruments to compensate for externalities. The farmer’s
decision-making process is modelled as a ‘black box’, which does not consider how
preferences are formed and choices are made (Ben-Akiva et al., 1999; McFadden,
1999) and are limited in their ability to account for process and context in decision
making, failing to account for heterogeneity in decision making among farmers. If the
willingness to invest in vaccination is also driven by intrinsic and social motives, this
could imply that a mix of policy instruments, rather than simply ﬁnancial compensa-
tion, is needed to make voluntary approaches more eﬀective (Barnes et al., 2015;
Ochieng’ and Hobbs, 2016).
A complementary body of literature focuses on the identiﬁcation and assessment of
key factors that inﬂuence decision making on livestock disease control, using qualita-
tive and quantitative research methods. In addition to instrumental considerations
(e.g. private risks and income eﬀects), the experiential consequences of disease control
decisions are important for many farmers (Elbers et al., 2010; Gethmann et al., 2015;
Sok et al., 2015). In the economic literature, these are described as non-use or passive
values (e.g. Hansson and Lagerkvist, 2015; Schreiner and Hess, 2017) or non-pecuni-
ary beneﬁts (Howley, 2015). Another key factor is that private decisions could be
inﬂuenced by social pressures through diﬀerent types of perceived norms (Jones et al.,
2015; Vande Velde et al., 2015; Sok et al., 2016b). Furthermore, it is important to
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account for speciﬁc perceptions about disease risk, about the safety and eﬀectiveness
of applied measures and about the trust and conﬁdence in the disease control
approach chosen by animal health authorities (e.g. Perry et al., 2001; Flaten et al.,
2005; Heﬀernan et al., 2008; Palmer et al., 2009; Valeeva et al., 2011; Schemann
et al., 2012; Toma et al., 2013; Alarcon et al., 2014; Enticott et al., 2014; Maye et al.,
2014; Sok et al., 2016a).
Several authors in the domain of economics of animal health have suggested com-
plementing economic theory with insights from behavioural sciences to improve the
understanding of livestock disease control decisions, to identify ways of motivating
farmers to comply with voluntary approaches (Barnes et al., 2015; Gilbert and Rush-
ton, 2016). It would be useful to develop and test a utility model representation of
farmers’ behaviour that allows for heterogeneity in the motives to invest in disease
control, before further studying the dynamic interactions between farmers’ collective
behaviour and disease epidemiology. Given the nature of disease control eﬀorts as
public goods and the presence of non-use values in decision making, a stated prefer-
ence approach can assess farmers’ preferences for diﬀerent attributes of livestock dis-
ease control policies (Adamowicz et al., 1998). In addition to instrumental attributes,
such as the vaccine eﬀectiveness or costs (Bennett and Balcombe, 2012), key factors
that were previously described can help in deﬁning other attributes that are important
for policy-making.
This study has two objectives: ﬁrst, to assess farmers’ preferences for policy-related
attributes of a bluetongue vaccination scheme; second, to improve the understanding
of the factors underlying the behavioural heterogeneity in farmers’ preferences for
these attributes. We use a survey-based discrete choice experiment to derive farmers’
marginal utilities of attributes of public voluntary bluetongue vaccination schemes.
Heterogeneity in preferences for attributes is commonly modelled via unobserved ran-
dom eﬀects (McFadden and Train, 2000; Hensher and Greene, 2003) and readily
observable and relatively objective characteristics. More recently, preference hetero-
geneity is partially modelled using latent constructs from social psychology to enhance
the behavioural representation in choice models. Such models have been mainly devel-
oped in the marketing and transport literature, where they are known as the hybrid
choice model or integrated choice and latent variable model (ICLV) (e.g. Ben-Akiva
et al., 2012; Hildebrandt et al., 2012). The ICLV model oﬀers a general econometric
framework to supplement economic theory with concepts or theories from other
social sciences (Walker and Ben-Akiva, 2002; Walker et al., 2007). We use the ICLV
approach to incorporate preferences for attributes, latent social-psychological con-
structs in addition to readily observable farm and farmer characteristics.
2. Framework: Integrated Choice and Latent Variable Model
The vaccination choice is formulated as a discrete choice problem, which is consistent
with random utility theory and various econometric models. Vaccination schemes dif-
fer in terms of a few choice attributes. The utility derived from a vaccination scheme
is the sum of the utilities derived from the choice attributes (Lancaster, 1966). Faced
with alternative vaccination schemes, farmers are presumed to choose the alternative
(or the option to not vaccinate) that is likely to give them the highest utility.
The standard approach in econometrics to account for heterogeneity in preferences
is to include a random component using a mixed logit model speciﬁcation (McFadden
and Train, 2000; Hensher and Greene, 2003) and readily observable and relatively
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objective characteristics. In the mixed logit model, the utilities of the choice attributes
are assumed to vary across farmers according to some pre-speciﬁed (usually normal)
distributions and the suﬃcient statistics describing the distribution are estimated (for
a normal distribution: the mean and the standard deviation). If the estimated standard
deviations are signiﬁcant, statistical unobserved heterogeneity in preferences is pre-
sent. However, as there are many sources of preference heterogeneity, researchers
have indicated that the underlying causes of heterogeneity need to be better under-
stood by linking the heterogeneity to the characteristics of the decision maker (e.g.
Louviere et al., 2002; Rigby and Burton, 2005; Kjær and Gyrd-Hansen, 2008; Hess,
2012). In their seminal papers on the ICLV model framework, Ben-Akiva et al. (1999,
2002, 2012) suggest taking more account of process (steps involved in decision mak-
ing) and context (factors aﬀecting the process) to enhance the behavioural representa-
tion in choice models. They do so by including social-psychological constructs in
choice models (Hess, 2012).
In the ICLV model framework, attitudes are used most frequently for modelling
preference heterogeneity (Hess and Beharry-Borg, 2012; O’Neill et al., 2014; Mariel
et al., 2015), but personality traits (Vredin Johansson et al., 2006; Yangui et al.,
2016) and speciﬁc perceptions (Marquez et al., 2014; Kassahun et al., 2016) are also
used. Studies have also considered the eﬀect of the social environment on decision-
making (Abou-Zeid and Ben-Akiva, 2011; Kamargianni et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2014;
Czajkowski et al., 2017).
We capture process and context by three latent constructs: attitude, the injunctive
norm and the descriptive norm in relation to participation in a bluetongue vaccina-
tion scheme. These constructs are operationalised using latent constructs from the
reasoned action approach (RAA) decision model from social psychology (Fishbein
and Ajzen, 2010). This model not only suggests which constructs explain behaviour
but also provides a method to measure them consistently. Sok et al. (2015, 2016b)
previously applied the RAA model to the bluetongue vaccination problem. They
found that attitude and social pressures (both perceived norms) best explained
intention, while control considerations played only a minor role. Based on these
results, only attitude, injunctive norm and descriptive norm were measured in the
current survey.
Attitude is deﬁned as ‘a latent disposition or tendency to respond with some degree
of favourableness or unfavourableness to a psychological object’, where the latter
includes behaviour (Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010, p. 76). It is the farmer’s positive or neg-
ative evaluation of performing vaccination, and can be based on instrumental (e.g.
risk insurance) as well as experiential beliefs (e.g. animal suﬀering) (Sok et al., 2015,
2016a).
Injunctive norms are deﬁned as ‘perceptions concerning what should or ought to be
done with respect to performing a given behaviour’, while descriptive norms refer to
‘perceptions that others are or are not performing the behaviour in question’ (Fish-
bein and Ajzen, 2010, p. 131). Sok et al. (2015) identiﬁed the following referents of
inﬂuence for the bluetongue vaccination problem: family members, the veterinarian,
peers and leaders, and the buyer.
The next section presents our materials and methods, including the choice experi-
ment design, the indicator variables and the econometric models we use to estimate
the relationships. Section 4 presents our results, while section 5 provides some discus-
sion of the results and section 6 concludes.
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3. Materials and Methods
3.1. Survey
The choice experiment survey2 measured three groups of variables: choices, indicators
for the social-psychological constructs and socio-demographic characteristics.
Respondents were asked to choose their preferred alternative from each of eight
choice sets. Each choice set consisted of two hypothetical vaccination schemes and a
no-choice option. Each vaccination scheme was deﬁned in terms of a combination of
levels for ﬁve choice attributes. Figure 1 shows an example of a choice card. Table 1
provides an overview of all attribute levels. The survey continued with statements that
measured attitude and perceived norms and ended with questions about farm and
farmer characteristics.
3.1.1. Choice experiment design
The Netherlands is currently free of bluetongue. A hypothetical scenario was there-
fore developed that described, as realistically as possible, a situation where bluetongue
had been detected 100 kilometres from the premises of the respondent. Next, it was
mentioned that veterinary experts estimated the probability of infection as 5 out of 10
farms during the summer of 2015. Animal health authorities were preparing a vacci-
nation scheme in which the respondent could participate during the spring of 2015
(when the survey was sent out). Participation in the vaccination scheme would reduce
the probability of infection at the farm towards nil. Instructions explaining the choice
task followed the scenario description. Attributes and their levels were explained and
an example of a choice card was shown.
Participation in            
vaccination scheme 1 
No vaccination EXAMPLE CARD Vaccination scheme 1 
Probability of serious vaccine 
adverse effects is small
1 OUT OF 1,000 COWS
Information via veterinarian 
Costs: € 12.00 per cow 
Subsidy: 60 per cent 
YOU PAY: € 4.80 PER COW
Probability of infection is nil
1 OUT OF 1,000 FARMS
Vaccination scheme 2
Probability of serious vaccine 
adverse effects is negligible
1 OUT OF 100,000 COWS
Information via leaflet 
Costs: € 8.00 per cow 
Subsidy: 10 per cent 
YOU PAY: € 7.20 PER COW
Probability of infection is nil
1 OUT OF 1,000 FARMS
Probability of infection is significant
AT LEAST 5 OUT OF 10 FARMS
WHAT DO YOU CHOOSE? 
No participation in any 
vaccination scheme 
Participation in            
vaccination scheme 2
Figure 1. Example of a choice card with two hypothetical vaccination schemes and a no-choice
alternative
2The questionnaire is available from the authors upon request.
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The scenario description and selection of choice attributes and their levels (see
Table 1) were set by a multidisciplinary team, consisting of a veterinary epidemiolo-
gist, economists specialised in animal health and a statistician, to ensure that the
choice card designed to capture farmers’ perceptions and preferences would be both
actionable for policy-makers and ﬁt within a workable experimental design. The
results from previous studies on the identiﬁcation and assessment of key factors that
inﬂuence decision-making on bluetongue vaccination were also considered (Elbers
et al., 2010; Sok et al., 2015, 2016a).
The choice attributes 1 to 4 are policy related. The previous bluetongue vaccination
scheme in the Netherlands (in 2008–10) used inactivated vaccines, which have very
low probabilities of adverse eﬀects. The attribute ‘probability of serious adverse vac-
cine eﬀects’ was still included to reﬂect farmers’ perceived trust and conﬁdence in the
vaccine safety and eﬀectiveness and in the disease control approach chosen by animal
health authorities. Two types of policy instruments were included as attributes: ‘gov-
ernment information’ (communication), as an informational instrument that can
increase the motivation by reasoned opinions: and ‘government subsidy’, as an incen-
tive-based instrument to encourage participation by lowering the net cost of vaccina-
tion. The level of subsidy can also have a signalling function, indicating the extent to
which the government takes the issue seriously. The attribute ‘vaccination costs per
cow’ was included as a price attribute. The attribute ‘probability of infection in the
herd’ only varied between the vaccination and no-vaccination (no-choice)
alternatives.
A fractional factorial main-eﬀects experimental design resulted in 16 hypothetical
vaccination schemes, from which 16 choice sets were generated by means of a cyclic
design. Sixteen more choice sets were generated by permuting ‘communication’ levels
in such a way that all possible pairs of ‘communication’ levels appeared in choice sets.
The 32 choice sets were partitioned into four blocks. Each respondent was oﬀered
eight choice cards with three alternatives: two hypothetical vaccination schemes with
varying levels on the ﬁrst four attributes and an opt-out alternative, the latter repre-
senting the choice not to vaccinate.
Table 1
Details of the selected choice attributes and attribute levels of the vaccination schemes
Choice attributes
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Description Probability of
serious adverse
vaccine eﬀects
Government
comm.
Government
subs.
Vaccination
costs per
cow
Probability of
infection in
the herd
Levels Signiﬁcant No communication No subsidy 4 Signiﬁcant
(ASC_no)
Small Through leaﬂet 10 per cent 8 Nil (ASC_yes)
Negligible Through vet 60 per cent 12
Through lﬂt & vet
Note: The base levels are in cursive text.
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3.1.2. Indicators representing social-psychological constructs
Farmers’ attitude towards participation in a bluetongue vaccination scheme were mea-
sured using ﬁve 7-point semantic diﬀerential scales with bipolar adjectives, such as
(un)satisfying and (un)important, taking into account both instrumental and experien-
tial (non-use) aspects (see Table 3 below). Thus, the question for each scale was: ‘Par-
ticipation in a vaccination scheme against bluetongue is <adjective> for my farm’.
The injunctive norm with respect to participation in a bluetongue vaccination
scheme was measured using three 7-point Likert-type scales with end points ‘disagree
strongly’ and ‘agree strongly’. The three statements were: ‘People who have a lot to
do with my farm expect me to participate in a vaccination scheme against bluetongue’,
‘People whose opinions or vision I value would approve of me participating in a vacci-
nation scheme against bluetongue’ and ‘People who are close to me expect me to par-
ticipate in a vaccination scheme against bluetongue’. The descriptive norm with
respect to participation in a bluetongue vaccination scheme was measured using two
7-point Likert-type scales with end points ‘disagree strongly’ and ‘agree strongly’. The
statements were: ‘Surrounding dairy farmers will participate in a vaccination scheme
against bluetongue’ and ‘Dairy farmers in my social network will participate in a
vaccination scheme against bluetongue’.
3.1.3. Farm and farmer characteristics
Farm characteristics were selected to capture the variation in scale and intensity with
which the farm is operated, namely herd size, average milk production and the amount
of pasture land utilised. Whether heifers are kept for export was the ﬁnal farm charac-
teristic measured. The farmer characteristics measured were age and level of education.
3.2. Econometric approach
Figure 2 visualises the ICLV model for the bluetongue vaccination problem as an
integration of a discrete choice model and a latent variable model. The use of latent
Social psychological 
constructs ηln
Utility Uint
Stated choices to 
vaccinate or not dint
Farm and farmer 
characteristics zpn
Scores on attitude 
and perceived norm 
indicators ykln
Scores on attribute 
levels of the 
vaccination scheme 
Xsi
Latent variable model (MIMIC)
βs
λklγlp
αsp τsl
Choice model (MNL)
ζln
vint
εkln
Figure 2. The integrated choice and latent variable model speciﬁcation used in this paper.
Squares represent observed variables and ellipses represent latent variables
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variables instead of observed variables for conceptualising social-psychological con-
structs is advocated by, for example, Walker (2001). The latent variable model is sup-
posed to capture some of the process and context of decision making by measuring
farmers’ attitude and injunctive norm and descriptive norms. These social-psychological
constructs are expected to reﬂect part of the behavioural heterogeneity farmers have
for diﬀerent vaccination scheme attributes.
Various statistical approaches have been used to capture constructs in choice mod-
els (Walker, 2001). One approach is to include the indicators directly in the utility
function (e.g. Onozaka et al., 2011). Measurement error can be introduced with this
approach since the indicators are only a function of the construct and not the underly-
ing construct itself. There is also a risk of creating endogeneity bias since it is likely
that unobserved eﬀects at the same time inﬂuence the response to choice as well as
indicator questions (Ashok et al., 2002). Another approach is to ﬁrst perform a factor
analysis on the indicators, and then include the resulting construct(s) in the utility
function (e.g. Greiner, 2015). In the aforementioned study no farm and farmer charac-
teristics were used to explain preference heterogeneity. Within the ICLV model frame-
work, it is recognised that farm and farmer characteristics can impact both on latent
variables as well as on utility (see Figure 2).
Two statistical approaches result in consistent estimates for ICLV models: the
sequential estimation approach (limited information, two steps) and the simultaneous
estimation approach (full information, one step) (Walker, 2001). In the sequential
estimation approach, a multiple indicator and multiple causes model (MIMIC)
(J€oreskog and Goldberger, 1975; Diamantopoulos et al., 2008) is used to specify and
test the relationships between farm and farmer characteristics and the attitude and
perceived norms indicators (see Figure 2). A MIMIC model is a special case of struc-
tural equation modelling (SEM). The predicted conditional means (factor scores) of
these constructs are saved and entered into the choice model speciﬁcation. The simul-
taneous estimation approach estimates a MIMIC and choice model in a single step
and is thus more eﬃcient. However, the maximum likelihood procedure often suﬀers
from convergence problems when multiple latent variables are included because of
multiple integrals (e.g. Raveau et al., 2010; Daziano and Rizzi, 2015; Bahamonde-
Birke et al., 2017). We therefore adopt the consistent but less eﬃcient sequential esti-
mation approach.3 The models were estimated with Stata 13 (StataCorp, 2013), which
provides built-in commands for estimating SEM and alternative-speciﬁc conditional
logit (McFadden’s choice) models. The user-written command developed by Hole
(2007) was used to estimate mixed logit models.
3.2.1. Latent variable model
The MIMIC model was estimated using the two-step approach for SEM following
Anderson and Gerbing (1988). The ﬁrst stage consists of testing the measurement
model that speciﬁes the relations between the latent constructs (attitude, injunctive
norm and descriptive norm) and their observed indicators, also known as a conﬁrma-
tory factor analysis model.
3Eﬀorts were made to estimate the ICLV model simultaneously using Pythonbiogeme (Bierlaire,
2016) to test whether more eﬃcient parameter estimates could be obtained. This was unsuccess-
ful. Models with only one latent variable were successfully estimated but indicated only small
diﬀerences in standard errors compared to similar models estimated in a sequential manner.
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Scores on indicators ykln for latent variable l were modelled as eﬀects of scores on
their corresponding latent variables gln:
ykln ¼ kkl  gln þ ekln; ð1Þ
where ykln is the score for decision maker n on the kth reﬂective indicator of latent
variable gl, ekln is the measurement error in that score and kkl are factor loadings, cap-
turing the eﬀect of gl on ykl (Figure 2). The measurement errors for each indicator
were assumed to be normally i.i.d. and uncorrelated across indicators.
The overall model ﬁt was assessed using the goodness-of-ﬁt measures most com-
monly used in the SEM literature, along with their cut-oﬀ values for acceptance (see
e.g. Hu and Bentler, 1998, 1999; Bagozzi and Yi, 2012): the root mean square error of
approximation (RMSEA) ≤ 0.06, the Bentler comparative ﬁt index (CFI) ≥ 0.95 and
the standardised root mean square residual (SRMR) ≤ 0.08. The validity of the
hypothesised latent constructs was also assessed.4 Hair et al. (2010) describe construct
validity as the extent to which a set of observed variables actually reﬂects the latent
construct which those variables are designed to measure, requiring convergent and
discriminant validity. Good convergent validity (reliability) of a speciﬁc latent con-
struct is indicated by a high proportion of shared variance among indicators, and is
usually assessed with the average variance extracted (AVE) and composite reliability
(CR) statistics (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). Good discriminant validity means that a
latent construct is truly distinct from other latent constructs, and is assessed by check-
ing whether the AVE values of a latent construct exceed its correlations with other
latent constructs.
Given a good ﬁt and acceptable validity, the structural model was estimated in the
second stage. In addition to equation (1), the social-psychological constructs were mod-
elled as being partially caused by observed farm and farmer characteristics (Figure 2):
gln ¼
X
p
clp  zpn þ fln; ð2Þ
where clp are regression coeﬃcients capturing the eﬀect of the pth farm or farmer char-
acteristic zp on gl. The error terms fln were assumed to be normally i.i.d. and allowed
to correlate across latent variables. Assuming that the farm and farmer characteristics
are speciﬁed as error free, the error terms represent the impact of all remaining
explanatory variables on the latent variables (Diamantopoulos, 2006). Equations (1)
and (2) were jointly estimated as a MIMIC model. All farm and farmer characteristics
were included simultaneously in the structural model to test their eﬀects on the latent
constructs. Eﬀects that were not signiﬁcant at the 20 per cent critical level were
removed one at a time in an iterative process, starting with the eﬀect that had the low-
est t-value (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001). Scores for the latent variables
included in the ICLV models were derived from the ﬁnal MIMIC model.
3.2.2. Choice model
Assuming a rational cognitive process of utility maximisation, the decision maker n
chooses alternative i in choice situation t in which he or she faces the set of available
alternatives Cnt if:
4Although the simultaneous estimation approach has become standard in the ICLV literature, a
potential danger when using this approach is that not enough attention is given to the validity
of the hypothesised social-psychological constructs.
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Uint[Ujnt; 8j 6¼ i; j 2 Cnt: ð3Þ
UtilityUint of alternative i for decision maker n in choice situation t was modelled as:
Uint ¼ Vin þ vint; ð4Þ
where Vin is called the representative utility, which is the part of the utility that is
deterministic and vint is a stochastic error term that is independently Type-1 extreme-
value distributed, which leads to a multinomial (MNL) model speciﬁcation
(McFadden, 1974).
In the case where no preference heterogeneity is considered among decision makers,
the representative utility is dependent on the trade-oﬀs made between attributes, and
Vin is modelled as a linear speciﬁcation:
Vin ¼ bs  Xsi ðMNLÞ ð5Þ
where Xsi are the attributes with level s of bluetongue vaccination scheme alternative
i, and bs are the regression coeﬃcients that can be interpreted as marginal utilities.
Preference heterogeneity among decision makers can be introduced in the model by
adding a normally distributed stochastic component to the marginal utilities, which
leads to a mixed logit (MXL) model speciﬁcation (Hensher and Greene, 2003):
Vin ¼ bs þ rsnð Þ  Xsi ðMXLÞ ð6Þ
where rsn is a vector of parameters that represents the individual decision maker’s
deviations from the average marginal utilities, so that each decision maker now
derives speciﬁc marginal utilities (bsn ¼ bs þ rsn) from the attributes. These individual
deviations are assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean. Regarding the
relaxation of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property in this study,
correlations across alternatives and choice situations were still assumed to be zero.
Preference heterogeneity can also be introduced deterministically, modelling it as a
function of farm and farmer characteristics zpn as well as social-psychological
constructs (latent variables) gln:
Vin ¼ bs  Xsi þ
X
p
asp  zpn þ
X
l
ssl  gln
 !
 Xsi ðMNL with interactionsÞ ð7Þ
Considering ﬁve choice attributes with a total of 12 levels (Table 1), six farm and
farmer characteristics and three latent constructs (Table 2), 108 interaction eﬀects
could be considered for inclusion in the model. To keep the model parsimonious, an
interaction variable selection procedure5 was executed. The most important reason
for this procedure was the expected high intercorrelations between latent constructs.
High intercorrelations between attitude and perceived norms are the rule rather than
the exception (Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010), and therefore the risk of multicollinearity
exists if all interactions with all latent constructs are retained. Leaving latent con-
structs out, on the other hand, can result in omitted variable bias. Finally, an overall
5Interactions were tested one at a time by adding each interaction (involving all dummies coded
for the particular attribute) separately to equation (5). This extensive procedure was done to
avoid the issue that some eﬀects would already be masked at this stage due to multicollinearity
among the observed and latent variables. The criterion used was a likelihood-ratio test between
a restricted (choice attributes only) and unrestricted (interactions added) model. Using this cri-
terion, 28 of the 108 possible interaction variables were selected.
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MNL and an overall MXL model were estimated, including all selected interaction
eﬀects.
The categorical choice attributes 1–3 were dummy coded, taking the levels in italics
in Table 1 as base levels. Dummy coding was used to ensure an appropriate speciﬁca-
tion of the random components in the MXL models (see Walker et al., 2007). The
base level for the cost attribute was located at €8. The ﬁfth choice attribute was also
dummy coded, with the value 1 for the opt-out alternative, thereby accepting a signiﬁ-
cant probability of infection in the herd. This shows the relative utility (equivalent to
an alternative-speciﬁc constant (ASC)) farmers attach to the no vaccination alterna-
tive compared to the base vaccination scheme. The base vaccination scheme was rep-
resented by the following attribute levels: ‘probability of serious adverse vaccine
eﬀects’ is small, ‘government communication’ through leaﬂet, ‘government subsidy’ at
10 per cent and the ‘vaccination costs per cow’ at €8.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics of stated choices, perceived experiences of the previous Bluetongue epi-
demic, and scores for farm and farmer characteristics and indicators of attitude and perceived
norms
Variable Unit
Farmers who chose out of 8 choice
cards
Total or
averageAlways no
Sometimes
yes
Always
yes
Farm(er)s Number 20 56 135 211
Share of sample Percentage 9.5 26.5 64.0 100.0
Past Bluetongue epidemic experiences
Infected* Percentage ‘yes’ 30.0 39.3 48.1 44.1
Percentage ‘no’ 45.0 46.4 40.7 42.7
Percentage ‘don’t know’ 20.0 14.3 11.1 12.8
Vaccinated* Percentage ‘yes’ 5.0 37.5 52.6 44.1
Percentage ‘no’ 85.0 58.9 43.7 51.7
Percentage ‘don’t know’ 5.2 3.6 3.7 3.8
Farm and farmer characteristics
Herd size† Number 105 119 97 104
Milk production † Kilograms (avg. cow) 7,582 8,655 8,616 8,529
Pasture land† Hectares 68 49 44 47
Export of heifers Yes = 1, No = 0 0.10 0.18 0.32 0.26
Age† Years 52 46 48 48
Higher education Yes = 1, No = 0 0.27 0.20 0.29 0.27
Average score on indicators
Attitude‡ Scale 1–7 3.32 4.29 4.72 4.47
Injunctive norm‡ Scale 1–7 2.43 3.34 4.21 3.81
Descriptive norm‡ Scale 1–7 2.60 3.22 4.12 3.74
Notes: *One farmer in the group ‘Always no’ did not report the past Bluetongue experiences, so
N = 19 for these two questions.
†These variables were mean-centred, before entering the choice model.
‡These variables were factorised and normalised, before entering the choice model (see latent
variable model).
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3.3. Sample
The sample consisted of 1,500 randomly selected Dutch dairy farms drawn from the
National Cattle Identiﬁcation and Registration Database. The farms selected for a
previous survey on bluetongue conducted in 2014 were ﬁrst removed from this data-
base before the sample was drawn (see e.g. Sok et al., 2015). The selected farms were
randomly subdivided into four groups. All of these groups received two diﬀerent
blocks in an ascending or descending order of choice cards. Each farmer in the sample
was sent a paper copy of the survey along with an accompanying letter and a pre-paid
return envelope. Farmers were oﬀered two possibilities to ﬁll in the questionnaire,
using the paper copy or via a web page. By ﬁlling in their e-mail address, respondents
had a 10 per cent chance of winning a gift coupon worth €25.
The survey was sent out in the last week of April 2015. A reminder was sent three
weeks after the survey was sent out, followed by another reminder three weeks later.
A total of 280 farmers responded, a response rate of almost 19 per cent. This was low
compared to the response rate of almost 28 per cent for the survey on bluetongue vac-
cination conducted in 2014 (e.g. Sok et al., 2015). The diﬀerence in response rates is
most likely because of the timing of the surveys. The ﬁrst survey was held in January/
February while the second was held in April/May, when farmers are more likely to be
busy with ﬁeld activities.
Observations with missing values were excluded from the statistical analysis, result-
ing in an eﬀective sample size of 211 respondents. Most of the excluded surveys missed
the whole set of indicators or farm and farmer characteristics, or both. For surveys
that missed only a few values, the most frequently missing variables were average milk
production and education level (46 responses were missing both variables).
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the stated choices, perceived experiences dur-
ing the previous bluetongue epidemic, and the scores for farm and farmer characteristics
and indicators for attitude and perceived norms. The ﬁrst row shows the distribution of
respondents’ vaccination choices. The next two rows show the perceived experiences
during the previous bluetongue epidemic. The majority of the farmers always chose a
vaccination alternative (64 per cent) while about one tenth never chose a vaccination
alternative. Farmers who perceived their herd to be infected or perceived they vaccinated
during the previous epidemic more often chose a vaccination alternative from the eight
choice cards. Approximately 44 per cent of the farmers reported that they had vacci-
nated in the previous epidemic, indicating that the sample also captured farmers without
previous vaccination experience. The sample representativeness was further checked by
comparing the values for farm and farmer characteristics with the values measured by
other sources. According to the Dutch Farm Accountancy Data Network, the average
dairy farm in the Netherlands had 103 dairy cows and 55 hectares of land in 2015 (LEI,
2016). According to statistics from the Cattle Improvement Co-operative, average milk
production (305 days) of dairy cows in the Netherlands was 8,573 kilograms in 2015
(CRV, 2015). A similar survey among dairy farmers executed in 2014 (Sok et al., 2016a)
reported similar results for farmer characteristics (age and education level).
4. Results
4.1. Latent variable model results
In the ﬁrst step, the measurement model was tested to assess the overall model ﬁt and
the validity of the latent constructs (equation (1)). Values of the indices measuring the
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overall model ﬁt were all below the criteria for acceptance (v2/df = 1.42 with P-value
0.06, RMSEA = 0.04, CFI = 0.99 and SRMR = 0.03). The values of the AVE (0.69,
0.56 and 0.72 for attitude, injunctive norm and descriptive norm, respectively) and CR
(0.80, 0.78 and 0.84) statistics further conﬁrmed good validity of the hypothesised latent
constructs. Therefore the proposed measurement model speciﬁcation was accepted and
the structural model was estimated. The ﬁnal MIMIC model with the selected farm and
farmer characteristics showed good model ﬁt (v2/df = 1.33 with P-value 0.03,
RMSEA = 0.04, CFI = 0.98 and SRMR = 0.04). Table 3 shows the results of this esti-
mation. Herd size, milk production level and pasture land availability are associated
with variability in attitude. These associations suggest that farmers who have more
intensive dairy farms are more favourable towards vaccination. Some of these associa-
tions also apply to variability in perceived norms. Another clear pattern is that farmers
who export heifers have a more positive attitude and higher injunctive and descriptive
norms. Finally, older farmers scored lower on descriptive norm.
Farm and farmer characteristics explained only a little of the variance in each latent
construct. Much of the unexplained variance, captured by the disturbance terms, is
Table 3
Estimation results from the MIMIC model
Attitude Injunctive norm Descriptive norm
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
Structural model
Herd size 0.11 (0.08) 0.18 (0.08)**
Milk production 0.08 (0.06)
Pasture land –0.36 (0.08)*** –0.34 (0.09)*** –0.18 (0.07)***
Export of heifers 0.19 (0.07)*** 0.18 (0.07)*** 0.23 (0.07)***
Age –0.11 (0.06)*
Explained variance (R2) 0.14 0.10 0.10
Measurement model
Unsatisfying-satisfying scale 0.78 (0.03)***
Unimportant-important scale 0.86 (0.02)***
Bad-good scale 0.89 (0.02)***
Useful-useless scale –0.83 (0.02)***
Disturbing-reassuring scale 0.79 (0.03)***
People who have to do a lot
with my farm [. . .]
0.79 (0.04)***
People whose opinions or
vision I value [. . .]
0.54 (0.06)***
People who are close to me [. . .] 0.87 (0.03)***
Surrounding dairy farmers [. . .] 0.80 (0.04)***
Dairy farmers in my social
network [. . .]
0.89 (0.04)***
Disturbance term intercorrelations
Attitude 1
Injunctive norm 0.59 (0.06)*** 1
Descriptive norm 0.58 (0.06)*** 0.64 (0.06)*** 1
Notes: N = 211. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance level at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
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shared between latent constructs, as shown by the disturbance term correlations
(Table 3).
4.2. Choice model results
Table 4 reports the ﬁnal model estimations after the selection procedure for the inter-
action variables. All models ﬁtted the data well: the McFadden’s pseudo R2 measures
were within or beyond the range for a good model ﬁt (0.2–0.4) (Hensher et al., 2005).
The MXL models outperformed the MNL models, reﬂected in the values for the
pseudo R2, Akaike information criteria (AIC) and the Bayesian information criteria
(BIC).6
Starting with the MNL and MXL models without interactions, positive marginal
utilities imply an increase in utility relative to the base level, making participation in a
vaccination scheme more probable. All marginal utilities had the expected sign, e.g.
the marginal utility of vaccination costs was negative, meaning that higher cost
decreases utility and the likelihood of participation in a vaccination scheme. Com-
pared to the vaccination scheme with base levels, the likelihood of participation
increased with the probability of serious adverse vaccine eﬀects being negligible,
government communication provided via veterinarians and government subsidy of
60 per cent. The likelihood of participation decreased with vaccination costs and the
probability of serious adverse vaccine eﬀects being signiﬁcant. The utility of no gov-
ernment subsidy was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the base level of 10 per cent,
suggesting that the level of subsidy has a categorical rather than a marginal eﬀect on
preferences. Something similar held for government communication: the utility of no
communication was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the base level of providing infor-
mation through leaﬂets. Finally, the signiﬁcant negative beta of the no-choice or opt-
out alternative indicated that if farmers did not choose any vaccination alternative,
their utility signiﬁcantly reduced. This suggests that many farmers are willing to par-
ticipate in a bluetongue vaccination scheme to minimise the probability of infection in
their herd.
The estimated sigma’s in the MXL model show the choice attributes that have pref-
erence heterogeneity. This was the case for all choice attributes except government
communication. In the MNL and MXL models with interactions, most interaction
eﬀects related to the probability of infection in the herd (ASC) and the probability of
serious adverse vaccine eﬀects.
Results from the MIMIC model previously suggested that higher scores on the
latent constructs are relatively weakly associated with larger-scale farms, more inten-
sive farms and farms that keep heifers for export. Part of these eﬀects are thus
absorbed in the predicted conditional means of these latent constructs. However, the
underlying farm characteristics still interacted signiﬁcantly with some choice attri-
butes, in particular with the marginal utility of the no-vaccination option. Thus,
6Both mixed models were also estimated without any identiﬁcation constraints on the standard
deviations of the random marginal utility coeﬃcients. Results showed that our identiﬁcation
constraints (ﬁxing the standard deviations of the marginal utilities for the base levels to 0), clo-
sely (for the model without interactions) or perfectly (for the model with interactions) coincided
with the recommendation by Walker et al. (2007) to constrain the smallest standard deviations
from the unconstrained models to 0 for identiﬁcation.
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farmers operating larger-scale and/or more intensive dairy farms are more likely to
vaccinate, as are farmers who export heifers.
Farmers’ age and education level were not inﬂuential in the MIMIC model in
explaining variability in the latent constructs. In the choice models with interactions,
age had a moderating eﬀect on monetary attributes: the level of government subsidy
and vaccination costs. Older farmers appear willing to pay more for the vaccine given
that they derive less utility from the government subsidy of 60 per cent and less disutil-
ity from higher vaccination costs. Farmers with higher education degrees are less
likely to vaccinate if the probability of serious adverse vaccine eﬀects is signiﬁcant.7
Attitude and injunctive norm interacted negatively with the ASC – the utility of the
no-choice or opt-out alternative. Thus, the more favourable the farmer’s attitude
towards vaccination and the more social pressure perceived by the farmer, the more
likely the farmer is to vaccinate. Attitude also interacted positively with government
communication provided via veterinarians, while injunctive norm interacted nega-
tively with government subsidy of 60 per cent. Descriptive norm interacted positively
with the probability of serious adverse vaccine eﬀects being negligible.
5. Summary and Discussion
In their utility trade-oﬀs between choice attributes, farmers perceived the probability
of serious adverse vaccine eﬀects as one of the most important attributes. Preference
heterogeneity for this attribute was retrieved via interactions with pasture land, educa-
tion level and descriptive norm. The ﬁrst two interaction eﬀects might show that farm-
ers’ views on disease resistance (or resilience) and its consequences for the intensity
with which a farm should be operated are linked with how they perceive the likelihood
and impact of adverse vaccine eﬀects. This links to results from the latent variable
model, where it was found that farmers who have more (less) intensive dairy farms are
more (less) favourable towards vaccination.
The importance of perceived trust and conﬁdence in vaccine safety and eﬀectiveness
and in the disease control approach chosen by animal health authorities is highlighted
by two interaction eﬀects in particular. Descriptive norm interacted positively with
the probability of serious adverse vaccine eﬀects being negligible. This suggests that
farmers are more likely to vaccinate if they perceive that others in their social network
vaccinate (presumably without experiencing adverse eﬀects). Furthermore, attitude
interacted positively with government communication provided via veterinarians.
Attitude change, communication and persuasion are closely related. Source and mes-
sage characteristics (e.g. credibility) together with the internal motivation and ability
to process information determine whether attitude change is induced (e.g. Petty and
Cacioppo, 1996; Blackstock et al., 2010). Sok et al. (2015) showed for the same
research problem that the government representative was one of the least important
referents, while the veterinarian and peer farmers were more important referents.
Frewer et al. (1996) show that for food-related risks, government representatives are
among the least trusted sources of risk information.
7An interaction eﬀect between education level and the ASC was highly signiﬁcant in both the
MNL and MXL models. However, the interaction variable selection procedure revealed that
this correlation was spurious. Since dummy coding was used, the eﬀect captured was the signiﬁ-
cant interaction between education level and the probability of serious adverse vaccine eﬀects
being small (see Bech and Gyrd-Hansen, 2005 for an explanation).
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Another important ﬁnding relates to the provision of a government subsidy as a
means to lower the vaccination costs for the farmer. Injunctive norm interacted nega-
tively with government subsidy of 60 per cent. Subsidisation is an incentive-based pol-
icy instrument and functions, just as certain norms, as an external motivating factor.
As such, subsidisation and social pressures via injunctive norms are both external
motivating factors. Our results indicate that these factors might function as substi-
tutes for at least some farmers.
This ‘crowding out’ eﬀect has been reviewed by Bowles and Polanıa-Reyes (2012, p.
368), who indicate that ‘this may occur when incentives adversely aﬀect individuals’
altruism, ethical norms, intrinsic motives to serve the public, and other social prefer-
ences’. One of the suggested underlying mechanisms for the substitution eﬀect is that
subsidies can negatively aﬀect one’s sense of autonomy (and not the capacity) over
the behaviour, resulting in resistance to rather than compliance with the policy.
The interactions found between farm characteristics and the ASC reveal some clear
economic motives for farmers to prefer vaccination to no vaccination. Herd vaccina-
tion is often used as an insurance against the production risk from disease infection,
and also guarantees that heifers can be continuously exported irrespective of the
status of the epidemic (Sok et al., 2014). However, the interactions found between
social-psychological constructs and the ASC suggest that perceived social pressures
also induce vaccination behaviour as well just as the experiential components of atti-
tude (e.g. animal welfare considerations). This suggests that in addition to economic
motives, farmers can have social and intrinsic motives to invest in disease control.
This study brings together diﬀerent perspectives from economics and social psy-
chology8 using the ﬂexible structure of the ICLV model framework. Compared to the
MNL, the social-psychological constructs explain a considerable part of the prefer-
ence heterogeneity in the ASC, resulting in better model ﬁt statistics. Compared to the
MXL model with preference heterogeneity modelled randomly, the social-psychologi-
cal constructs provide behavioural explanations for the diverse preferences underlying
farmers’ choices to vaccinate against bluetongue. In particular, farmers’ attitude pro-
vided a sound behavioural interpretation of why vaccination is preferred to no vacci-
nation. Attitude has also been used to explain status quo eﬀects in choice experiments
(Meyerhoﬀ and Liebe, 2009). Other latent constructs that could be relevant for mod-
elling preference heterogeneity in livestock disease control decisions are anticipated
emotions, such as guilt or regret (Onwezen et al., 2013), or dimensions of personal
norms (Thøgersen, 2006). In this respect, choice models are emerging that are based
on minimising anticipated random regret rather than on maximising random utility
(Thiene et al., 2012; Hensher et al., 2013; Chorus, 2015).
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications
Results of this study suggest that, in the presence of a bluetongue outbreak, many
dairy farmers in the Netherlands are willing to participate in a vaccination scheme to
minimise the probability of herd infection. Farmers have economic, intrinsic or social
motives to invest in livestock disease control. The likelihood of participation can be
increased with providing information and subsidies. However, the eﬃcacy of these
8Some of the axioms underlying the standard economic model could have been violated with
the inclusion of social-psychological constructs, for a discussion see Ben-Akiva et al. (1999).
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policy instruments to motivate farmers to vaccinate is heterogeneous and not neces-
sarily positive for each farmer. This study has two implications for the design of pol-
icy instruments to increase the eﬀectiveness of voluntary approaches to livestock
disease control.
The ﬁrst policy implication relates to the provision of subsidies. In designing live-
stock disease control schemes, it is often argued that governments should use ﬁnan-
cial, incentive-based policy instruments to compensate farmers for externalities,
assuming they act in rational self-interest. The results of this study suggest that farm-
ers can have private economic motives (incentives) to participate in a vaccination
scheme, such as to insure the production risk from disease infection and to maintain
the export of heifers. This suggests that a government subsidy might not be necessary
for each farmer to guarantee a positive net beneﬁt from vaccination. Results further
suggest that the relationship between the level of subsidy and the likelihood of partici-
pation in voluntary vaccination schemes is not necessarily positive. A crowding-out
eﬀect was found between injunctive norm and government subsidy. The crowding out
of intrinsic and social motives could be minimised by explaining to farmers what the
meaning is of providing subsidy and where the ﬁnancial sources come from. The level
of subsidy and the manner in which compensation and reimbursement is oﬀered can
have a signalling function, indicating the extent to which the animal health authorities
take the issue seriously.
The second implication relates to the provision of information. Perceived trust and
conﬁdence in the vaccine safety and eﬀectiveness and in the government approach,
which were reﬂected in preferences for the attributes ‘probability of serious adverse
vaccine eﬀects’ and ‘government communication’, were conditional on farmers’ atti-
tude and descriptive norm towards participation in a vaccination scheme. Information
about the vaccine and the way in which animal health authorities plan to co-ordinate
the vaccination strategy is best provided via communication channels that are per-
ceived as credible and trustworthy. Farmers are more likely to vaccinate if they per-
ceive that others in their social network perform vaccination without experiencing
adverse eﬀects.
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